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A. Introduction 
The implications of Brexit for the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) are 
inevitably uncertain, but they will also be just as inevitably profound and unsettling.  However, to 
return to the beginning of the UK’s period ‘in Europe’, the implications of the UK’s entry to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 were also profound and unsettling of its relations 
with the rest of the Commonwealth.  To that point, the Commonwealth had certainly been much 
more than an international trading and economic organisation.  Resting on the legacy of Empire, 
it was still a setting for the promotion (too often unsuccessful) of parliamentary democracy; mutual 
international assistance; educational and public health support; common cultural and sporting 
traditions; diplomatic and consular support; the official use of English; and (for sub-groups of 
Commonwealth countries) security, defence and intelligence-sharing.  The British diaspora of the 
previous three centuries meant personal blood-relationships remained strong between UK and 
other Commonwealth nationals.  All citizens of Commonwealth countries were still recognised as 
British subjects.1  And the Commonwealth had, to a significant extent, a genuinely shared legal 
tradition.   
Entry to the EEC was just as critical a moment in the development of the Commonwealth 
because, in substantial effect, it was a political decision to reverse the British Imperial project.2  
 
* Professor of Law; Head, School of Law and Justice, University of Southern Queensland, Australia. This article is 
based on a paper given in the Development of Private International Law in the UK Post Brexit, United Kingdom 
Arts and Humanities Research Council and Journal of Private International Law Workshop, Online, 26 November 2020.  
I also thank Dr Kirsty Hood QC for her input at the Workshop, and Dr Sarah McKibbin and Dr Vanitha Sundra-
Karean for comments on an earlier draft.     
1 The status was changed to that of ‘Commonwealth citizen’ from 1983: s 37, Sch 3 British Nationality Act 1983 (UK).  
2 J Bowle, The Imperial Achievement: The Rise and Transformation of the British Empire (Penguin, 1977) 526–7.  Niall Ferguson 
concludes that entry to the EEC should be understood as a distinctly political decision to re-profile the UK economy, 
and was not a consequence of its existing trade with Europe.  In 1965, Commonwealth trade was twice as important 
to the UK as EEC trade; amounting respectively to 35 per cent and 18 per cent of total UK trade.  The quantity of 
Commonwealth trade could not be sustained once the UK assumed EEC trade barriers.  ‘[I]t was the political decision 
that caused the economic change, not the other way around’: N Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World 
(Penguin, 2003) 361.     
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The colonial expansion of England, Scotland and Great Britain from the 16th century was largely 
a commercial venture.  While the Empire had other purposes — even moral purposes — those 
such as defence, emigration and permanent settlement remained inextricably bound to the 
promotion of British trade and commerce.  The dominant industries of other Commonwealth 
countries, principally in agriculture and commodities, had largely been developed to serve the 
industrial and commercial development of the UK.  Even in 1973 many Commonwealth countries’ 
trade depended significantly on access to UK markets.   
As a result, no other country in the Commonwealth supported the UK’s entry to the EEC.3  
Once entry took place in 1973, access to UK markets met the EEC’s higher customs barriers and, 
above all, the strong protectionist measures of the Common Agricultural Policy.4  The subsequent 
evolution of the EEC into the European Community and the EU generally saw, with some late-
period exceptions,5 little change to the UK’s formal trading and commercial relationships with 
other Commonwealth countries.  For the most part, the UK’s place in Europe offered no benefits 
to the Commonwealth above those guaranteed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
So while, at least in public, other Commonwealth governments have been careful not to comment 
on the Brexit referendum or its politics since 2016, the number that have entered preliminary 
negotiations with the UK for free trade agreements6 suggests that leading economies in the 
Commonwealth have welcomed Brexit for the economic opportunities it presents. 
 
3 See D Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (Fontana Press, 1977) 382–3.  For accounts 
of Australian, Canadian and New Zealand reactions to EEC entry, see A May (ed), Britain, The Commonwealth and Europe 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).  
4 For the exception made for New Zealand, see text to below n 210.  
5 The exceptions are that, from 2004, Cyprus and Malta also became member states of the EU.  Canada and the EU 
have a comprehensive trade agreement that has been provisionally in force since 2017.  Singapore has had a free trade 
agreement with the EU since 2019.  The EU also has Interim Partnership Agreements or Partnership Agreements 
with Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Cameroon, Dominica, Fiji, Ghana, Granada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, South Africa, St Kitts and Nevis, 
St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.  However, Partnership Agreements bring no 
change to tariffs and (relative to Word Trade Organisation regulation) do not bring preferential access to EU markets. 
6 The UK seeks to continue the EU’s trade agreements with Cameroon, Canada and Singapore.  Australia and New 
Zealand are in negotiations with the UK for free trade agreements.  The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP 11), to which the UK is negotiating entry, includes, amongst others, Australia, 
Brunei, Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.  Bangladesh and India are in pre-negotiation discussions with 
the UK for trade agreements.   
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 The question is whether Brexit also presents opportunities for the development of private 
international law in the Commonwealth — including the UK.  There are two aspects to those 
opportunities.  First, there is the content of the principles of private international law in the 
Commonwealth; in particular, whether the UK’s release from the lawmaking of the EU Council 
and Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), could enhance mutual 
engagement with other Commonwealth countries in the development of private international law.  
Secondly, there is the role of private international law in coordinating the commercial and personal 
relationships of individuals and businesses across borders.  To what extent might the private 
international law of the Commonwealth have to adjust to the different place of the UK in the 
world after Brexit?  It is in this connection that the economic significance of Brexit for other 
Commonwealth countries is most significant.  For the UK, a broader and deeper trading 
relationship with the United States will certainly be of greater importance than any with the 
Commonwealth.  However, for any other Commonwealth country, improved access to UK 
markets will be of great commercial and economic significance.  It may yet influence the shared 
legal tradition.  
 In suggesting how the private international law of the Commonwealth is likely to develop 
after Brexit, an account must be given of the status, trajectories and interrelationship of the law in 
different Commonwealth countries while the UK was ‘in Europe’.  Accordingly, Part B addresses 
Europeanisation as the most significant difference to have emerged between the private 
international law of the UK and of other parts of the Commonwealth.  In Part C, an account is 
given of both the continuing lead that English adjudication has given to private international law 
in the Commonwealth and, yet, the greater fragmentation of that law while the UK was in the EU 
between 1973 and 2019.  Part D addresses a development that is a direct consequence of the UK’s 
membership of the EU: the trans-Tasman market and the integration of Australian and New 
Zealand private international law. Part E’s conclusion considers the improved trading and 
commercial opportunities of Brexit, and the role that private international law could have to 
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support them.  This concentrates on more efficient means of securing the cross-border 
enforcement of judgments within the Commonwealth, and the example given in that respect by 
the Commonwealth’s federations and the trans-Tasman market.  Possible directions that the cross-
border enforcement of judgments could take in the Commonwealth are explored.    
A number of preliminary observations must be made.  The Commonwealth is a large and 
diverse international organisation, second in size only to the United Nations.  As a result, this 
account cannot cover the law in all 54 countries that are currently Commonwealth member states.  
Therefore, in addition to a consideration of the private international law in the UK, I limit this 
account to developments in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore.  These four countries 
are those whose courts’ judgments are most commonly cited in UK courts and, so, alongside the 
UK courts are the most prominent in the development of the Anglo-common law.  It is no 
coincidence that these four countries are also the first four that engaged in serious free trade 
negotiations with the UK7 — and so the first Commonwealth countries for which private 
international law coordination of private trading and commercial relationships with the UK is most 
likely to be needed.    
At the time when the UK entered the EEC, Professor Cheshire’s claim that English private 
international law ‘has been only lightly touched by the paralysing hand of the Parliamentary 
draftsman’8 still rang true.9  Dicey and Morris noticed that statutes were bringing radical changes in 
family law, but otherwise ‘the courts have been busy in elaborating and refining the rules of the 
conflict of laws’.10  The European era of UK private international law ended that – although in 
addition to Brussels, the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) has also been 
partly responsible for this shift to legislation.11  Europeanisation also brought profound cleavage 
with the law of almost all other Commonwealth countries.  The hand of the EU drafters brought 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 GC Cheshire, Private International Law (Clarendon Press, 1935) preface.  
9 PM North, Cheshire’s Private International Law, 9th edn (Butterworths, 1974) preface to first edition.  
10 JHC Morris (ed), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 9th edn (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1973) ix.   
11 PM North, Essays in Private International Law (Clarendon Press, 1992) 20–1. 
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permanent change to UK private international law and, even after Brexit, significantly directs how 
UK courts address multistate litigation.  While the adoption of HCCH conventions has also seen 
legislation emerge as a larger source of private international law in the rest of the Commonwealth,12 
common law adjudication has continued to predominate.   
 As will be seen, the UK’s entry to the EEC most directly caused divergence between its 
law and that of other Commonwealth countries through Europeanisation and the reconsideration 
of some trading associations in the Commonwealth.13  There is also a unique occasion when the 
UK’s place in Europe was used in the Commonwealth to justify changes to the law.14  However, 
it is more often that other processes of legal decolonisation, which were already in train before 
1973, influenced changes in other Commonwealth countries.  Even for Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand — the dominions that were the most closely integrated within the Imperial system — 
EEC entry accelerated a cultural reorientation from pride in Empire to independent nationalisms,15 
and this influenced a willingness to engage in independent legal development.  The UK’s period 
in Europe also saw the end of two legal processes that formalised the legal independence of these 
countries form the UK and each other.  First, appeals from the highest courts in these countries 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ceased.  All appeals to the Privy Council from 
Canada had already ended in 1949,16 but for the other three countries this happened much later.  
In Australia, appeals from federal and territory courts ended in 1968,17 from the High Court of 
Australia in 197518 and from state courts in 1986.19  Singapore ended all civil appeals in 1989,20 and 
New Zealand in 2004.21  Secondly, there is the UK’s abdication of lawmaking power for each of 
 
12 R Mortensen, R Garnett and M Keyes, Private International Law in Australia, 4th edn (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Sydney, 2019) 19; M Hook and J Wass, The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2020) 8. 
13 See text to below nn 27-56, 209-230. 
14 See text to below nn 78-101. 
15 S Ward, ‘The Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship’ in May (n 3) 156, 156. 
16 S 3 Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act, SC 1949 (2nd sess) (C). 
17 S 4 Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth). 
18 S 3 Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth). 
19 S 11 Australia Act 1986 (Cth & UK). 
20 Judicial Committee (Amendment Act) 1989 (Sg). 
21 S 42 Supreme Court Act 2004 (NZ).   
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these other countries.  The patriation of all lawmaking power, in effect, took place for Singapore 
in 196622 and New Zealand in 1986.23  These were ‘legal revolutions’ in Kelsen’s sense, because 
the removal of UK lawmaking power was achieved through local legislation.  For Canada in 198224 
and Australia in 1986,25 the UK Parliament itself more conventionally abdicated its lawmaking 
power for the two countries.  However, the highest courts of all of these countries continued to 
show respect for the English courts’ adjudication in private international law, and this has been 
especially marked in New Zealand and Singapore.  Ironically, the removal of the theoretical 
possibility of the UK legislating for Australia and Canada led in substance to more revolutionary 
changes to private international law in those countries.   
 The Privy Council’s understanding of federalism had been an old gripe of Australian and 
Canadian judges.26 However, a stronger awareness in the 1980s and 1990s of how federalism 
should reshape private international law rested more immediately on the abdication of UK 
lawmaking power.  The two federal dominions’ courts were long used to adjudication under rigid 
constitutions: the British North America Act 1867 (UK) — which became the Constitution Act 
1982 (C) — and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK).  The removal in 
the 1980s of even the theoretical possibility of the UK Parliament passing legislation for the two 
countries saw a subtle shift in the status of these two constitutions as the nation’s unqualified basic 
law.  In ways that are not seen in New Zealand, Singapore and the UK, the Australian and Canadian 
courts began to expect that all law, including the common law and private law, had to conform to 
any requirements of the basic law of the federal constitution.  Less predictably, federalism in 
 
22 The legislative powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (ie, the king) and the Malaysian Parliament ceased for 
Singapore, and were transferred to the Singapore Parliament, in 1965: s 5 Republic of Singapore Independence Act 
1965 (Sg).  In 1966, the UK Parliament passed its last statute relating to Singapore and giving it independence and 
recognising sovereignty: Singapore Act 1966 (UK): see T Li-Ann, ‘The Post-Colonial Constitutional Evolution of the 
Singapore Legislature: A Case Study’ [1993] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 80.       
23 S 15(2) Constitution Act 1986 (NZ).   
24 S 2 Canada Act 1982 (UK).   
25 S 1 Australia Act 1986 (UK).   
26 Eg, Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087, 1111-1112; and see A Roland, ‘Appeals to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: A Canadian Perspective’ (2007) 32 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 569, 575-7.   
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Australia and Canada also motivated changes not only to the private law that deals with interstate 
or interprovincial questions, but also to the treatment of international questions. 
 
B. Europeanisation  
The web of European instruments that displaced the UK’s autochthonous private intentional law 
was extensive, and in the 21st century grew in depth as well as in coverage of the field.27  At the 
turn of the century, the only EU private international law instruments applicable in the UK were 
the Brussels Convention of 196828 relating to civil jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
within the EU, and the Rome Convention of 198029 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations.  The ‘parallel’ Lugano Convention of 1988,30 which extended the terms of the Brussels 
Convention to most countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),31  was also in 
place.  Both the Brussels Convention32 and the Rome Convention33 were updated and adopted as 
EU Regulations.  They have been supplemented with other Regulations on jurisdiction and the 
 
27 T Hartley, ‘The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of the Common Law of Conflict of Laws’ (2005) 
54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 813.  
28 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Brussels, 27 
September 1968 [1998] OJ C27/1, given effect in the UK by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. 
29 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, Rome, 19 June 1980 [1998] OJ C27/34, given effect 
in the UK by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
30 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
Lugano, 16 September 1988 [1988] OJ L319/9, also given effect in the UK by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Act 1982. 
31 Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Liechtenstein is a member of EFTA but is not party to the Lugano Convention. 
32 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1; Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgment 
in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ L351/1 (Brussels Ia).  Under the Brussels Convention, the UK 
secured special protection for judgments made in other EU countries against Canadian and Australian domiciliaries.  
Judgments made in EU member state courts against defendants domiciled outside the EU are enforceable throughout 
the EU regardless of the jurisdiction that the member state court exercised.  Art 59 Brussels Convention allowed 
member states to enter treaties with third countries by which enforcement of member state judgments could be refused 
when made against defendants domiciled in the third country.  The UK agreed with Canada in 1984 and Australia in 
1990 not to enforce such judgments against defendants domiciled in those countries: Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments (Canada) Order 1987 (UK); Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Australia) Order 1994 
(UK).  This arrangement was preserved under Art 72 Brussels Ia.   
33 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.    
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enforcement of judgments,34 and in applicable law in the Rome II Regulation on applicable law 
for non-contractual obligations.35  
 As part of the acquis communautaire, none of these Regulations now apply directly in the 
UK, although the applicable law Regulations — Rome I on contracts and Rome II on non-
contractual obligations — have been continued by legislation as part of UK law.36  The jurisdiction 
and judgments Regulations were important to the UK largely because of the capacity they gave to 
project the enforcement of UK judgments in the EU, but this depended entirely on the judgment 
having been made in a member state.  That is no longer the case.  The UK is therefore to rely on 
each EU member state’s individual domestic laws for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments if UK judgments are to be enforced in the EU.  It may also rely on the HCCH Choice 
of Court Agreements Convention 2005, to which the EU is party and to which the UK separately 
became party in 2020.  The Choice of Court Agreements Convention enables judgments to be 
enforced throughout the EU, on terms similar to those for enforcement under the Brussels I 
Regulation, when the parties had ‘bought in’ to UK jurisdiction by an exclusive choice of court 
agreement.  A broader capacity for the enforcement of judgments in Europe will only be possible 
if the UK is allowed to become party to the modified Lugano Convention37 — in which case it 
 
34 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] OJ L160/1; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children of both spouses [2000] OJ L160 (Brussels 
II); Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1347/2000 [2003] OJ L338/1 (Brussels IIa); Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations [2009] OJ L7/1 (Maintenance Regulation). 
35 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L199/40 (Rome II Regulation). 
36 See the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2019 (UK), made in the exercise of powers under s 8(1), Sch 7 para 21(b) European Union (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018.  See also European Commission, Notice to stakeholders — Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU 
rules in the field of civil justice and private international law, Brussels, 27 August 2020; HM Government, Department 
for Exiting the European Union, Providing a Cross-Border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework: A Future Partnership Paper, 
22 August 2020.  
37 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
Lugano, 30 October 2007 [2007] OJ L339/3. 
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will restore all of the capacity that the UK had under the Brussels I Regulation, as it stood in 2000, 
to have its judgments enforced in Europe.                          
 This is not the place to explore the Europeanisation of the UK’s private international 
law, which is reduced after the Brexit transition and, in effect, continues only in the admittedly 
significant areas of applicable law for contract, tort and some other non-contractual obligations.  
However, Europeanisation also only created differences between UK and other Commonwealth 
private international law because European legal models in the field have also had no success in 
being transplanted to the Commonwealth.  If, as Professor Harris says, ‘in more than one sense 
the English speak a different language to most of the rest of Europe’ and ‘are ill at ease with civilian 
concepts’,38 the English speakers of the Commonwealth are even more uncomfortable with 
them.39   
 The Australian Law Reform Commission undertook a review of Australian applicable 
law rules in 1992,40 and gave close attention to applicable law rules for contract.41  The Law Reform 
Commission’s general assessment was that the common law applicable law rules were ‘ill-defined, 
uncertain in scope and inadequate to deal with modern developments in international contracts’.42  
So far as models for reform were contemplated, the Rome Convention received considerable 
positive attention.  Aspects of the Convention’s treatment of party autonomy,43  mandatory rules44 
and consumer contracts45 were considered useful for reform.  An attractive aspect of the Rome 
Convention to the Law Reform Commission was its use of rebuttable presumptions to identify 
the proper law of the contract in the absence of a choice.46  The uncertainties of the common law’s 
 
38 J Harris, ‘Understanding the English Response to the Europeanisation of Private International Law’ (2008) 4 Journal 
of Private International Law 347, 347. 
39 Eg, see R Mortensen, ‘A Common Law Cocoon: Australia and the Rome II Regulation’ (2008) 9 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 203. 
40 Australian Law Reform Commission, Choice of Law — Report No 58 (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1992).  
41 Ibid, 81–107.  
42 Ibid, 81.  
43 Ibid, 82, 92.  
44 Ibid, 89, 91.  
45 Ibid, 104–5.  
46 Ibid, 94–7, 99.  
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unqualified ‘closest and most real connection test’ needed correction.47  As a result, the Law 
Reform Commission recommended introducing a structure for applicable law in contract that was 
based on the Rome Convention.  The proposal was that, in the absence of party choice, the law 
of the place where the contract had its most real and substantial connection would be the 
applicable law, but this was presumed to be the law of the place of characteristic performance.  
Greater detail was given as to where the place of characteristic performance was for contracts of 
employment, for contracts concerning rights in immovable property and for consumer contracts.48  
All were modelled on the Rome Convention.  Nothing has come of those recommendations, and 
after almost three decades nothing is likely to. 
 The Lugano Convention had also attracted some interest in Australia and New Zealand, 
with both countries’ national law reform agencies being asked whether the country should become 
a party to the Convention.  In 1996, the Australian Law Reform Commission noted that there 
would be advantages and disadvantages for Australia to join the Lugano Convention, and believed 
that ‘this is likely to be politically difficult given the level of approval required by the existing 
members.’49  It nevertheless thought that participation in a multilateral jurisdiction and judgments 
convention was more likely to be secured through the Lugano Convention than through the 
HCCH — and then referred the question of accession to the Lugano Convention to the Attorney-
General’s Department.50  It remains there.  In a review of electronic commerce by the New 
Zealand Law Commission in 1998, the Commission was asked to consider whether the Lugano 
Convention should be adopted in toto.51  The question was too large for the review, and the 
Commission briefly noted that consideration would have to be given to the question: ‘[t]he benefit 
of subscribing to a document such as the Lugano Convention is that New Zealand’s law would be 
 
47 Bonython v Commonwealth of Australia [1951] AC 201; James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) 
Ltd [1970] AC 583; see the general criticisms in Mortensen, Garnett and Keyes (n 12) 450-1.    
48 Australian Law Reform Commission (n 40) 94–8, 177–9.  
49 Australian Law Reform Commission, Legal Risk in International Transactions — Report No 80 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 1996) [9.44]. 
50 Ibid, [4.36]-[4.37].  
51 Law Commission, Electronic Commerce — Part One: Report 50, Parliamentary Paper E 31AK (Law Commission, 
Wellington, 1998) xix. 
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brought into line with the approach adopted by a number of our major trading partners.’52  It has 
not received subsequent consideration.  
 Finally, in 2006 a uniform bilateral scheme of civil jurisdiction and judgments was being 
considered by Australia and New Zealand in the context of their single economic market.  The 
model presented by the Brussels I Regulation received extensive consideration.53  The resulting 
trans-Tasman scheme is discussed later54 but, in the course of the review, the Brussels I Regulation 
was compared with the Australian federal scheme that is implemented in the Service and Execution 
of Process Act 1992 (Cth).  Alignment of the Australia-New Zealand scheme with the Act of 1992 
was always a consideration that would disfavour the Brussels model.  While the Brussels I 
Regulation was thought to be overly complex,55 the Trans-Tasman Working Party also based its 
recommendation not to adopt the Brussels model on the shared legal culture.  The Regulation:56  
… was originally designed for Member States when all were civil law countries. Its civil law origins do 
not make it the best model for two countries with a shared common law heritage.     
 
It is likely that European legal models were considered only because of the shared legal culture 
with the UK and the UK was in the EU.  The Trans-Tasman Working Party’s approach 
nevertheless reinforced that it was ‘ill at ease with civilian concepts’.57  After Brexit, it is even less 
likely that the proposals of the 1990s to consider adopting European models or joining the Lugano 
Convention would go any further.  However, as we will see in Part E, civilian concepts may yet be 
indirectly important in the influence that they have had on the two HCCH Conventions that 




52 Ibid, 106. 
53 See Australia (Attorney-General’s Department) and New Zealand (Ministry of Justice), Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings 
and Regulatory Enforcement — A Public Discussion Paper by the Trans-Tasman Working Group (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, 2006) (Trans-Tasman Discussion Paper); Attorney-General’s Department (Australia) and Ministry of Justice 
(New Zealand), Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement — Report by the Trans-Tasman Working Group 
(Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2006) (Trans-Tasman Report).   
54 See text to below nn 209–230. 
55 Trans-Tasman Discussion Paper (n 53) 12. 
56 Ibid, 11–12. 
57 Harris (n 38) 347. 
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C. Private international law in the Commonwealth, 1973-2019  
Through the UK’s period in what is now the EU, the English courts continued to be the most 
important external influence on the development of private international law in the other 
Commonwealth countries.  British legislative developments also influenced legislation and 
proposed legislation in the Commonwealth.  However, this was also a period in which the 
centrifugal forces of decolonisation also began to have significant effect.  It saw the collapse of 
the pre-1973 consensus in the Commonwealth on the content of the private international law of 
its member states. 
 
1.  Gravitational pull: Forum non conveniens  
The settling of the scope and role of the doctrine of forum non conveniens could be regarded as the 
most important development in the private international law of the Commonwealth during the 
UK’s membership of the EU.  The doctrine already had a long history in Scotland,58 and had been 
recognised in the United States from the early 20th century.59  It was different in the Anglo-
common law.  According to the English Court of Appeal in St Pierre v South American Stores (Gath 
& Chaves) Ltd,60 a stay of proceedings that had begun in a forum competens (a court with a power to 
judge them) was permissible only if, at the least, ‘continuance of the action would work an injustice 
because it would be oppressive or vexatious’ to the defendant or ‘would be an abuse of the process 
of the Court in some other way.’61  The greater suitability of a court elsewhere was irrelevant 
because ‘[t]he right of access to the King’s Court must not lightly be refused’.62  However, in 
 
58 For early cases, see Vernor v Elvies (1610) 6 Dict of Dec 4788; Anderson v Hodgson (1747) 6 Dict of Dec 4816.  The 
first reference to the term forum non conveniens seems to have been Lord Cowan’s in Macadam v Macadam (1873) 11 SC 
(3D) 860, 862.  See Sim v Robinow (1892) 19 R 665, 668; Société du Gaz de Paris v Société Anonyme de Navigation ‘Les 
Armateurs Francais’ 1926 SC (HL) 13, 22. 
59 Bagdon v Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co, 178 App Div 662, 663 (1917). However, something akin to forum 
non conveniens, although not called that, had already been used as early as Willendson v Forsoket, 29 F Cas 1283, 1284 
(1801). See also Gulf Oil Corporation v Gilbert, 330 US 501 (1947); Koster v (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co, 330 
US 518 (1947).  
60 [1936] 1 KB 382.  
61 Ibid, 398.  See also Maritime Insurance Co Ltd v Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners (1908) 6 CLR 194. 
62 St Pierre (n 60) 398.  
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English appeals from the time of its decision in The Atlantic Star63 in 1973, the House of Lords 
chipped away at this approach and progressively merged its ideas of oppression and vexation with 
concepts of the appropriateness of hearing the proceedings.64  The House of Lords completely 
abandoned any pretence of the St Pierre approach to stays of proceedings when the Scottish 
doctrine of forum non conveniens was adopted in its 1986 decision in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex 
Ltd.65  In Spiliada, a case where the forum competing with the English court was in British 
Columbia, Lord Goff said:66 
The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the ground of forum non conveniens where 
the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which 
is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, ie in which the case may be tried more suitably 
for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.  
 
In many respects, the doctrine aims to put the proceedings in (what is clearly) the more appropriate 
forum: as Lord Goff put it, the ‘natural forum … that with which the action had the most real and 
substantial connection’.67  If a clearly more appropriate forum is identified and the justice exception 
does not apply then, the plea gives the defendant a stay of proceedings in cases where jurisdiction 
is founded ‘as of right’68 or, if discretionary long-arm jurisdiction is being invoked, a dismissal of 
the proceedings.69  
 The Spiliada doctrine assists in putting litigation into the court where, having regard to all 
of its contacts with the parties and the proceedings, it has its closest and most real connection — 
although it does not guarantee it.  As will be seen,70 this makes it well-adapted to the coordination 
of provincial or state civil jurisdictions within a federation.  Spiliada was taken up quickly in other 
Commonwealth countries.  In the Privy Council, Lord Goff had made it clear as early as 1986 in 
 
63 Atlantic Star v Bona Spes (The Atlantic Star) [1974] AC 436. 
64 MacShannon v Rockware Glass Ltd [1978] AC 795; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50; The 
Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398. 
65 [1987] AC 460. 
66 Ibid, 476. 
67 Ibid, 477–8. 
68 Ibid, 477. 
69 Ibid, 473–4, 482. 
70 See text to below nn 102–121. 
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an appeal from Brunei that Spiliada would be applied.71  New Zealand was still subject to Privy 
Council supervision at this time and when, in McConnell Dowell v Lloyd’s Syndicate 396,72 the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal came to consider the question, Cooke P was already aware of the Privy 
Council’s position and adopted Spiliada without giving any special justification.73  The Privy 
Council itself followed this in an appeal from New Zealand in Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National 
Mutual Life Nominees Ltd,74  and it remains the settled position.75  Although not subject to Privy 
Council direction, the Singapore Court of Appeal adopted Spiliada without qualification in 
Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling Corp v PT Airfast Services Indonesia76 and it has repeatedly reinforced the 
application of Spiliada in questions of forum non conveniens.77  Equally, the Supreme Court of Canada 
did not quibble to adopt Spiliada for Canada’s common law provinces when the question had to 
be considered in the context of an anti-suit injunction in Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia 
(Workers Compensation Board).78   
In Amchem, Sopinka J also endorsed Lord Goff’s claim that ‘the law in common law 
jurisdictions is … remarkably uniform’,79 but this was already an exaggeration.  Sopinka J was 
aware that Australia was the Commonwealth’s outlier on the question of forum non conveniens (at 
least in international litigation), although he downplayed the practical consequences of this 
 
71 Société Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jak [1987] AC 871, 891–2, 896, 897–8.  
72 [1988] 2 NZLR 257. 
73 Ibid, 273, 275–6 (Cooke P), 280-3 Somers J).  See also the earlier decision in Oilseed Products (NZ) Ltd v HE Burton 
Ltd (1987) 1 PRNZ 313, 316–17. 
74 [1991] 1 AC 187, 212, 213. 
75 Kidd v van Heeren [2006] 3 NZLR 520; Wing Hung Printing Co Ltd v Saito Offshore Pty Ltd [2011] 1 NZLR 754. 
76 [1992] 2 SLR 776, 784 (Chao Hick Tin J). 
77 PT Hutan Domas Raya v Yue Xiu Enterprises (Holdings) Limited [2001] 2 SLR 49; Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Baron von 
Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR 377.  This is subject to one clarification in the context of commercial litigation.  The Singapore 
International Commercial Court is promoted as a specialist court for international disputes, and is modelled closely 
on the London Commercial Court.  In Rappo v Accent Delight International Ltd [2017] SGCA 27, it was argued that the 
availability of the International Commercial Court was a factor that weighed in favour of identifying Singapore as the 
natural forum in a forum non conveniens enquiry.  The Court of Appeal agreed.  Sundaresh Menon CJ pointed out (at 
[122]) that procedural advantages available in the International Commercial Court — such as establishing foreign law 
by submissions rather than evidence — were relevant factors to consider under the principles of Spiliada.  He cautioned 
(at [124]) that this was not ‘a free pass to elude all jurisdictional objections to the adjudication of a dispute in Singapore’, 
but (at [121]–[122]) it was plainly a factor that weighed in favour of the Singapore court as the forum conveniens in 
commercial proceedings. 
78 [1993] 1 SCR 897.   
79 Ibid, 921–2.   
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position.80  In 1991, a majority in the High Court of Australia held, in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills 
Pty Ltd,81 that proceedings in an Australian court could only be stayed or dismissed if they were, 
according to the St Pierre formula, vexatious or oppressive or an abuse of the court’s process.  The 
proceedings would nevertheless be treated as vexatious or oppressive if the court regarded itself 
as a ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ to determine them.82  This approach allows an Australian court 
to hold on to jurisdiction even when there is a more appropriate forum elsewhere that has 
jurisdiction to deal with the case: that is, where the Australian court is not the natural forum.83  
Spiliada was rejected, partly on the ground that it did not represent the position in the United 
States, and partly because the Supreme Court of Canada was yet to consider it.84  The position 
settled in Voth was also openly a compromise because, on the first occasion when the Australian 
High Court had come to consider Spiliada and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it failed to secure 
any majority agreement on the point.85  In Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc v Fay,86 a 
majority of the High Court refused a stay of a New South Wales case that concerned an injury 
suffered in Greece.  In dissent, Wilson and Toohey JJ thought that Spiliada ‘should henceforth 
chart the course for the common law in Australia’87 and considered the Greek court to be the 
natural forum for the proceedings.88  In the majority, Brennan J continued to apply the St Pierre 
standards of oppression and vexation,89 and Deane J and Gaudron J opted for a position midway 
between Spiliada and St Pierre90 – the position that eventually became the majority view in Voth and 
which rejected Spiliada.91  As Deane J admitted, this was actually the position that the House of 
 
80 Ibid, 917–18.   
81 (1990) 171 CLR 538. 
82 Ibid, 557–60 (Mason CJ and Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ). 
83 Ibid, 558. 
84 Ibid, 560–1. 
85 MC Pryles, ‘Judicial Darkness on the Oceanic Sun’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 774. 
86 (1988) 165 CLR 197. 
87 Ibid, 213. 
88 Ibid, 218. 
89 Ibid, 232–3. 
90 Ibid, 247–8 (Deane J), 266 (Gaudron J). 
91 Ibid, 251–3 (Deane J), 265 (Gaudron JJ).  See also ibid, 240 (Brennan J). 
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Lords had reached in The Atlantic Star.92  However, in rejecting for Australia the adoption of the 
English position on forum non conveniens, Gaudron J relied to some extent on perceived differences 
in judicial culture that had developed because of the UK’s place in the EU, and gave a small nod 
towards Australian nationalism:93 
Our legal heritage is the gift of the common law of England, and our legal system necessarily has 
much in common with that of England. Where, however, developments in the common law of 
England reflect underlying changes which may not be matched in Australian law or society, care 
must be exercised in determining the extent to which changes in the English common law should 
be reflected in the common law of this country. For example, expressions of preference in England 
for ‘judicial comity’ rather than ‘judicial chauvinism’ … are readily understandable when it is borne 
in mind that England is a member of the European Community, which is not merely an alliance of 
similarly minded sovereign nation states, but a community with its own parliament, its own laws 
and its own court. Indeed, the European court has said that member states ‘have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields’ ...                    
 
In response to this claim, Wilson and Toohey JJ said:94 
In our view the evolution of English law since The Atlantic Star cannot be ascribed to local 
considerations such as the incorporation of the United Kingdom into the European Economic 
Community. Rather, this century has witnessed such a transformation in communications and 
travel, coupled with a greater importance attaching to considerations of international comity as the 
nations of the world become more closely related to each other … 
Gaudron J’s claim that the UK’s period in the EU had made English judges less ‘chauvinistic’ is 
unpersuasive, and rests on a number of misconceptions.  Admittedly, it was too early to see how 
negatively the CJEU would eventually respond to the discretions given by the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens and its companion principles for anti-suit injunctions95 — although this response 
reinforces how little those developments in the common law had to do with any Europeanising of 
civil jurisdiction.  But, first of all, although Gaudron J was aware of the long history of the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens in Scotland,96 she ignored the implication of that history that the doctrine 
took its present shape earlier than the UK’s membership of the EU.  And further, the House of 
Lords’ dissatisfaction with St Pierre was expressed as early as The Atlantic Star97 in 1973.  Lord Reid 
 
92 Ibid, 247. 
93 Ibid, 263. 
94 Ibid, 212. 
95 Case C-281/02 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383; Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR I-3565; Case C-
185/07 Allianz SpA v West Tankers Inc [2009] ECR I-663. 
96 Oceanic Sun (n 86) 262. 
97 Atlantic Star (n 63). 
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had referred to St Pierre as a ‘rather insular doctrine’98 long before there could have been any EU 
legal acculturation of English judicial attitudes or policy.99  Having said that, as Gaudron J’s 
approach to forum non conveniens became the accepted position of the Australian High Court in 
Voth,100 it is evident that the development of this distinctive Australian approach to the doctrine 
rests partly on a perception — a mistaken perception on this issue — that the UK’s place in the 
EU was of juridical significance.101 
 The position that Australian law reached in Voth is somewhat ironic, given how important 
the idea of the natural forum has become, in both Canada and Australia, to internal questions of 
the allocation of civil jurisdiction between provinces and states.  In Canada, this has not been done 
through the discretionary considerations that help to identify the forum conveniens.  It has arisen in 
questions of forum competens — that is, when the Canadian court has the power to assume 
jurisdiction.  Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye102 was a case concerning the recognition of an 
interprovincial judgment.  In delivering the judgment of a unanimous Supreme Court, La Forest J 
held that a Canadian court should recognise a judgment made in another province if the 
proceedings had a real and substantial connection with the province in which the judgment was 
rendered.103  It represented a departure from the 19th and early 20th century English position that 
required the defendant to have been present in the country where judgment was rendered at the 
time of being served with a writ, or where the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
rendering court.104  La Forest J thought that modern conditions required a more generous basis 
for the recognition of a judgment.  Even though the older English rules had been partly developed 
within the context of English courts recognising, or rather not recognising, judgments made 
 
98 Ibid, 453. 
99 Ibid, 464, 468-9 (Lord Wilberforce), 473, 475, 477 (Lord Kilbrandon).  Cf ibid, 458, 462 (Lord Morris), 473 (Lord 
Simon). 
100 See text to above nn 81–92; see also Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491; Puttick v Tenon 
(2008) 238 CLR 265.   
101 For early academic opinion in Australia that entry to the EEC would drive legal difference between the UK and 
Australia: FKH Maher, ‘The Common Law — Tears in the Fabric’ (1969) 7 Melbourne University Law Review 97, 109. 
102 [1990] 3 SCR 1077. 
103 Ibid, 1108–10.  
104 Ibid, 1095.  
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elsewhere in the Empire,105 they were especially inappropriate within a federation with a common 
citizenship and an integrated economy.106  The example of the EEC was mentioned — not as a 
justification for departing from English law — but to note that the Brussels Convention was 
designed to secure a similar broad base for the recognition of judgments.107  However, so far as 
adjudicative jurisdiction was concerned, La Forest J thought that this should correlate with the 
recognition of a jurisdiction that gives rise to a judgment that was enforceable across provincial 
borders.  He therefore held that a Canadian court could only assume jurisdiction in proceedings 
where they had a real and substantial connection with the province.108  This position is now well 
settled in Canada.109  In Morguard, La Forest J also noted the parallel that the new Canadian rule 
for forum competens had with the doctrine of forum non conveniens.110  Still, the Supreme Court has 
continued to recognise that the rules for assuming jurisdiction and those of forum non conveniens are 
distinct, even if, as ‘centre of gravity’ enquiries, they are related.  It is possible both for a plaintiff 
to establish that a court is competent because the proceedings have a real and substantial 
connection with the province, and yet for the defendant to argue successfully that the court is a 
forum non conveniens and has a discretion to stay the proceedings.111  
 In Australia, the principles of forum non conveniens are the central means of sorting civil 
jurisdiction within the federation.  The Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) enables 
a writ from a state court to be served anywhere in Australia — that is, in other states — and gives 
that court an unquestioned competence to judge.112   Furthermore, a judgment made by any state 
court is enforceable anywhere in Australia, and there are no defences that allow judgment debtors 
 
105 See, eg Emanuel v Symon [1908] 1 KB 302.  
106 Morguard (n 102) 1098–9.  
107 Ibid, 1100.  
108 Ibid, 1108–9. 
109 Hunt v T&N plc [1993] 4 SCR 289, 324–6; Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda [2012] 1 SCR 572, 589–90, 594; Chevron Corp 
v Yaiguaje [2015] 3 SCR 69, 99–100; and see GD Watson and A Frank, ‘Constitutional Limits on Service Ex Juris: 
Unanswered Questions from Morguard’ (2000) 23 Advocates’ Quarterly 167; V Black, ‘Simplifying Court Jurisdiction in 
Canada’ (2012) 8 Journal of Private International Law 411; J Blom, ‘Constitutionalizing Canadian Private International 
Law – 25 Years Since Morguard’ (2017) 13 Journal of Private International Law 259. 
110 Morguard (n 102) 1110.  
111 Club Resorts (n 109) 622–8. 
112 Ss 12, 15 Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth).   
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to resist enforcement.113  The means, therefore, by which concurrent proceedings and 
incompatible judgments are to be avoided, is to ensure that ‘the appropriate court’ deals with the 
litigation if there is any dispute over the exercise of jurisdiction.  The mechanism for putting the 
proceedings into the forum conveniens is either a stay of proceedings114  or, for superior courts, a 
transfer of the proceedings to the more appropriate Australian court.115  For transfers of 
proceedings, there was early uncertainty as to whether the proceedings should be transferred when 
under Spiliada criteria there was a clearly more appropriate court in another state to deal with 
them,116 or when under (what became) the principles of Voth the transferring court considered 
itself a clearly inappropriate forum to hear them.117  This was resolved by the Australian High 
Court when, in BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz,118 it held that the Spiliada search for ‘the more appropriate 
forum’ should indicate when, in transfer proceedings, a court should either retain the principal 
action or transfer it to another court.119  Lord Goff’s term ‘natural forum’ was freely used to 
describe the court that should retain or receive a transfer of the proceedings.120  As any state court 
is a forum competens whenever service of process occurs in Australia, Spiliada has become the 
principal means of defining the limits on the adjudicative jurisdiction of state courts — a 
prominence in schemes of civil jurisdiction that is almost unique in the Commonwealth.121                             
   
2.  Centrifugal forces: Applicable law in tort and the assessment of damages 
In 1973 the Commonwealth had a single reference for applicable law in tort and related questions 
of the assessment of damages, although that reference was broad, unclear and subject to different 
readings.  The 19th century rule in Phillips v Eyre122 requiring application of both the lex fori and the 
 
113 S 105 Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth).   
114 S 20(3) Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth).   
115 See, eg s 5 Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (NSW) and identical legislation in all other states.   
116 Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711.   
117 Platz v Lambert (1994) 12 WAR 319; Whyalla Refineries Pty Ltd v Grant Thornton (a firm) (2001) 182 ALR 274.   
118 (2004) 221 CLR 400.   
119 Ibid, 419-21 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ), 463–4 (Kirby J).    
120 Ibid, 423 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ), 448, 464 (Kirby J), 493 (Callinan J).  
121 See text to below nn 209–230. 
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lex loci delicti marked it as an oddity amongst common law applicable law rules.  The House of 
Lords’ decision in Boys v Chaplin123 in 1969 perpetuated the oddity and, momentarily, added to the 
confusion around applicable law in tort.  While holding in Boys that an English plaintiff could 
recover English damages from an English defendant for an accident in Malta, the House of Lords 
produced no ratio decidendi for that conclusion.124  Lord Hodson held that English law applied as, 
given the issue in question, England had a more significant relationship with the occurrence and 
the parties.125  Lord Wilberforce held that a cross-border tort claim required (what became known 
as) ‘double actionability’ — the claim had to be actionable in the forum and the place of the tort.126  
However, there was an exception to this double-barrelled applicable law rule when, in relation to 
a given issue, a single applicable law could govern the issue.  To determine this, it was necessary 
‘to identify the policy of the rule, inquire to what situations, with what contacts, it was intended to 
apply; [and] whether not to apply it, in the circumstances of the instant case, would serve any 
interest which the rule was devised to meet’.127  Lord Pearson held that double actionability was 
not required — the lex fori was the applicable law that governed liability as long as there was no 
legal justification for the defendant’s actions in the place of the tort.128  Lords Guest129 and 
Donovan130 dissented.   
 At least for England, Professor Morse accurately predicted that Lord Hodson’s and Lord 
Wilberforce’s speeches would influence subsequent understandings of Boys.131  The decision also 
magnetised the attention of other Commonwealth courts.  However, the unsatisfactory condition 
of the law meant that, once the centrifugal forces of legal decolonisation entered the questions 
raised by Boys, any general consensus around applicable law in tort across the Commonwealth 
 
123 [1971] AC 356. 
124 CGJ Morse, Torts in Private International Law (North-Holland Publishing Co, 1978) 282.  For a contrary view, see A 
Briggs, ‘What Did Boys v Chaplin Decide?’ (1983) 12 Anglo-American Law Review 237, 238. 
125 Boys (n 123) 380–1. 
126 Ibid, 389. 
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128 Ibid, 398. 
129 Ibid, 381–3. 
130 Ibid, 383. 
131 Morse (n 124) 282; see below n 132. 
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collapsed.  The developments show that these Commonwealth countries (including the UK) 
continued to trade in precedents with each other but, without the controlling direction of the 
House of Lords-cum-Privy Council, the applicable law rules that they individually developed drifted 
apart.   
 Lord Wilberforce’s approach in Boys was to require the proceedings to be actionable under 
both the lex fori and the lex loci delicti, but with a flexible exception in favour of applying a single 
applicable law.  This approach eventually predominated in England,132 with a more rational 
statement of the rule eventually being given by Lord Slynn in the Privy Council’s decision in Red 
Sea Insurance Company Ltd v Bouyges SA133  — an appeal from Hong Kong.  Lord Slynn effectively 
adopted Dicey and Morris’ recast of Lord Wilberforce’s approach in Boys:134 
(1) As a general rule, an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as such in England, 
only if it is both 
 
a)  actionable as a tort according to English law, or in other words is an act which, if done in 
England, would be a tort; and 
b)  actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it was done. 
 
(2) But a particular issue between the parties may be governed by the law of the country which, 
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the 
parties. 
 
It was explicitly recognised that the flexible exception allowed the lex loci delicti alone to be selected 
as the applicable law and, in Red Sea Insurance, this saw the Privy Council apply the law of Saudi 
Arabia for a claim in negligence brought in Hong Kong.135  Professor Briggs dubbed this position 
‘double actionability with double flexibility’.136 
 However, at the time of Red Sea Insurance the Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission had already recommended abandoning the double actionability rule for a simple lex 
 
132 Coupland v Arabian Gulf Oil Co [1983] 3 All ER 226; Armagas Ltd v Mundogas SA [1986] AC 717, 740-1, 752-3; Johnson 
v Coventry Churchill International Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 14; Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127; Kuwait Airways 
Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] 2 AC 883. 
133 [1995] 1 AC 190. 
134 Ibid, 198, 201; see L Collins (ed), Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 12th ed (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1993) 1487-8.    
135 Red Sea Insurance (n 133) 206. 
136 A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 2002) 182; A Briggs, ‘The Halley: Holed but Still Afloat’ 
(1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 18, 21. 
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loci delicti rule with an exception available for application of ‘the proper law of the tort’ — the place 
with the closet and most real connection to the circumstances and the parties.137  Amongst the 
motivations for the proposal was the need to align the law with that in other European countries.138  
Although aspects of the Commissions’ report were not implemented, the recommendations 
formed the central structure of Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1995 — which changed applicable law in tort in all UK countries.139  This Act gave a general 
rule that the applicable law in claims in tort was the lex loci delicti — ‘the law of the country in which 
the events constituting the tort or delict in question occur.’140  The place where the injury was 
sustained prevailed as locus delicti in personal injuries claims,141 and the situs of the property at the 
time of the damage in claims for damage to property.142  In all other claims, the applicable law was 
‘the law of the country in which the most significant element … occurred.’143  A statutory flexible 
exception was created in that, after having compared the significance of any factors connecting 
the tort or delict with the locus delicti and with some other country, it appeared that it was 
‘substantially more appropriate’ that the law of the other country should apply.144  However, the 
double actionability rule was preserved for claims in defamation, meaning that these still had to be 
actionable under the relevant UK law.145  
 The Commissions’ goal of aligning UK law with the law of its European partners was 
overtaken when, for the most part, applicable law in tort was Europeanised.  The Rome II 
Regulation deals with non-contractual obligations, although it excludes proceedings for breach of 
privacy and defamation,146 and therefore, in the UK, left a complicated structure across the field 
 
137 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Private International Law — Choice of Law in Tort and Delict, Law 
Com No 193, Scot Law Com No 129 (HMSO, 1990) 11-14. This was largely the work of two giants of private 
international law, Sandy Anton and Peter North. 
138 Ibid, 10. 
139 See s 9(7) Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK). 
140 S 11 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK). 
141 S 11(2)(a) Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK). 
142 S 11(2)(b) Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK). 
143 S 11((2)(c) Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK). 
144 S 12 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (UK). 
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of applicable law in tort.  Rome II has been incorporated into post-Brexit UK law.147  As it 
overrides and did not repeal the previous law, most questions of tort are captured by the patriated 
Rome II, but questions of privacy are dealt with under the Act of 1995 and, because the Act of 
1995 itself did not apply to claims in defamation,148 they are still subject to the double actionability 
rule of Red Sea Insurance.  Rome II also departs from the modern shift in applicable law to the lex 
loci delicti by placing ‘the law of the country in which the damage occurs’  — the lex loci damni — at 
the centre of applicable law in tort.149  It then gives some specificity to where the locus damni is for 
a range of non-contractual civil claims, and sometimes allows a number of places.  For example, 
the applicable law for product liability claims could (depending on the circumstances) be the law 
of the place where the person who suffered the damage was habitually resident when the damage 
occurred, the place where the product was acquired, or even the place where the defendant was 
habitually resident.150  The lex loci damni can be displaced in situations that parallel the common 
law’s flexible exception — the law of the place where the parties are habitually resident if they were 
habitually resident in the same place at the time the damage occurred, or the law of a place with 
which the tort is manifestly more closely connected — ‘[w]here it is clear from all the circumstances 
of the case’.151  Rome II also allows an agreement on the applicable law for the tort after or before 
the event giving rise to the damage — but if before only where all the parties to the agreement are 
pursuing a commercial activity and ‘freely negotiated’ the agreement.152                              
 As, under its accident compensation scheme, New Zealand has banned litigation relating 
to personal injuries,153 its courts rarely entertain foreign tort cases.  However, Baxter v RMC Group 
Plc154 involved actions for fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy for events that largely took 
place in England.  O’Regan J recognised, without question, that the double actionability rule as 
 
147 See above n 36. 
148 See n 145. 
149 Art 4(1) Rome II Regulation. 
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stated in Red Sea Insurance was law in New Zealand.155  In this case, he also considered that the 
flexible exception was easily established to have all questions in dispute governed by English law 
as the lex loci delicti.156  However, in 2017 the Parliament passed the Private International Law 
(Choice of Law in Tort) Act 2017 — legislation modelled directly on the UK Act of 1995 even 
though in the UK itself that legislation was largely overridden by the Rome II Regulation.157  The 
New Zealand Act abolishes the double actionability rule,158 and has all questions of tort governed 
by ‘the law of the country in which the events constituting the tort occur’.159  There is no exception 
in New Zealand for claims in defamation; they are also governed by the Act.160  The Act sets out 
a flexible exception in favour of the law of another place if ‘in all the circumstances it is 
substantially more appropriate for the law of another country … to be the applicable law.’161         
 The double actionability rule remains completely in force only in Singapore.  Boys is 
regarded in Singapore as ‘the “modern” starting point’ for choice of law in tort.162   However, in 
some respects, the requirement to show double actionability is reduced to a single lex fori rule.  The 
Singapore courts have consistently held that the plaintiff is entitled not to plead the lex loci delicti 
and, if the claim is not met by the defendant’s pleading the lex loci, this leads the court to conclude 
that the lex loci delicti is identical to the law of Singapore and so determines the question purely by 
reference to the lex fori.163  In Parno v SC Marine Pte Ltd,164 the Singapore Court of Appeal dealt with 
a workplace injury in Myanmar purely by reference to the Singapore Factories Act — legislation 
which provided for the plaintiff’s recovery.  Following the double actionability rule as stated in Red 
Sea Insurance, the Court of Appeal held that the failure to prove the law of Myanmar on workplace 
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accidents required it to presume its identity with the law of Singapore and, therefore, to recognise 
that the claim was actionable in both the forum and the locus delicti.165  As early as 2003, the Law 
Reform Committee of the Singapore Academy of Law recommended legislative reform to choice 
of law rules for tort along the lines of the UK’s Act of 1995 — even to the point of recommending 
the preservation of the double actionability rule just for defamation claims.166  Parliament is still to 
act.  In Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Baron von Uexkull,167 the Singapore Court of Appeal, still 
recognising the double flexibility of the exceptions to Boys’ double actionability rule, nevertheless 
considered that it needed to be ‘strictly applied’ so that it did not ‘overwhelm’ the general rule.168  
In giving the Court’s judgment, Andrew Leong J also reiterated that it was for the Singapore 
Parliament to abolish or reform the double actionability rule.169  So, while the Singapore courts 
have shown some sympathy for the simpler lex loci delicti rule adopted in Australia and Canada,170 
they consider themselves bound by Rickshaw to continue to apply the double actionability rule as 
it stood in Red Sea Insurance.171    
 Radical changes to applicable law in tort were driven by federal considerations in Australia 
and Canada, although more decisively in Canada.  These developments also demonstrate an 
intriguing interplay of the use of precedent in Australian, Canadian and UK adjudication which, 
contrary to the old House of Lords-cum-Privy Council directed uniformity, has added to the 
fragmentation of applicable law rules.  The process began with the High Court of Australia’s 
decision in Breavington v Godleman172 in 1988,173 when a 4:3 majority held that questions involving 
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interstate torts were to be determined by the lex loci delicti alone.  Constitutional considerations and 
a strong sense of the national unity that they create directed this decision for three judges in the 
majority.174  The fourth judge, Mason CJ, preferred to adopt the lex loci delicti rule as a common law 
rule, subject to a flexible exception; yet the need to coordinate private law relations within the 
federation still drove his conclusion.175  All four judges explicitly rejected application of the double 
actionability rule of Boys for interstate torts.176  A minority opted for the double actionability rule 
of Boys,177 although Brennan and Dawson JJ denied the possibility of its having any flexible 
exception.178  This lex loci delicti rule did not last long.  In two decisions on the classification of 
substance and procedure in private international law, a change in the composition of the High 
Court saw a new 4:3 majority reintroduce the double actionability rule.  In 1991 in McKain v RW 
Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd,179 a majority held that statutes of limitations were procedural 
laws and that their application was to be governed by the lex fori.  In Stevens v Head180 in 1993, the 
same majority held that, as questions of the assessment of damages were procedural, damages were 
to be assessed in accordance with the lex fori.   In both cases, this new majority departed from 
Breavington on the adoption of a lex loci delicti rule for torts and endorsed the double actionability 
rule as stated in Brennan J’s minority judgment in that case — that is, double actionability with no 
flexible exception.181 
 Although the actual decision in Breavington supporting a lex loci delicti rule was, without 
express overruling, quietly discarded in McKain and Stevens, the original decision received attention 
in other Commonwealth countries.  In Red Sea Insurance in 1994, the Privy Council noted the 
different approaches in Breavington but dismissed them as a ‘relaxation’ of Phillips v Eyre ‘in a federal 
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context’.182  There was no reference to McKain and Stevens.  More significantly, when in the same 
year the Supreme Court of Canada came to consider the applicable law in an interprovincial 
personal injuries case in Tolofson v Jensen,183 it was of the view that Breavington meant that ‘Australia 
has bypassed British precedents by adopting the lex loci delicti as the rule governing the choice of 
law in litigation within Australia’.184 McKain and Stevens were again unreferenced.  In giving the 
Court’s judgment La Forest J addressed, amongst other decisions, Boys and Red Sea Insurance, and 
concluded that ‘in none of these cases was the rule approached on the basis of Canadian 
constitutional imperatives.’185  The passing of the UK’s metropolitan status and of Privy Council 
supervision were also mentioned as reasons for abandoning Boys and adopting a lex loci delicti rule 
for cross-border tort claims in Canada.186  And, while refusing to recognise any exception to the 
lex loci delicti rule in interprovincial cases,187 La Forest J was sufficiently impressed with the 
reasoning in Boys and Red Sea Insurance to allow a flexible exception in foreign tort cases.188  In 
Tolofson, the Supreme Court also classified statutes of limitation as substantive law and, so, 
applicable if the relevant statute of limitation was part of the lex loci delicti.189       
 The Australian High Court revisited the substantive question of the applicable law rule for 
interstate torts in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson190 in 2000.  Internal relations between states in the 
federation loomed large in the consideration of the law.191  Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ emphasised the need for the common law to conform to constitutional 
imperatives,192 and considered the reference to the lex fori in the double actionability rule to be 
inconsistent with the recognition of a sister-state’s rights to regulate activity inside its own 
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borders.193  Kirby J also referred to Tolofson’s consideration of the effects of decolonisation.194  
Expressly endorsing Tolofson, the majority adopted a lex loci delicti rule — with no exceptions — for 
interstate tort questions.195  In John Pfeiffer, the High Court also implicitly overruled McKain and 
Stevens by holding that, at common law, statutes of limitation and questions of the assessment of 
damages should be considered matters of substance that are governed, in tort cases, by the lex loci 
delicti.196  And although federal constitutional considerations drove the decision in Pfeiffer, when the 
High Court came to consider the applicable law for foreign torts in Regie Nationale des Usines Renault 
SA v Zhang,197 it adopted precisely the same rule.  In Renault, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ again gave detailed consideration to Boys, Red Sea Insurance and Brennan 
J’s formulation of the double actionability rule as adopted in McKain and Stevens,198 and rejected it 
as a ‘technique of forum control specifically applicable in tort cases’.199  Tolofson was influential in 
suggesting that the approach to interstate and foreign tort cases should be aligned.200  In extending 
the lex loci delicti rule in Pfeiffer to foreign torts, the majority also again rejected any use of the flexible 
exception in Australian proceedings.201            
 Although the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act removed the need 
for UK courts to consider the reasoning in the Australian and Canadian applicable law cases, 
common law principles still applied to the classification of rules as substantive or procedural.202  In 
Harding v Wealands,203 the House of Lords (in an English appeal) dealt with a question of the 
assessment of damages for a motor vehicle accident in New South Wales.  Consideration was given 
to the Australian High Court’s decision in Stevens v Head,204 but this time with an awareness that it 
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had been implicitly overruled in Pfeiffer.205  Lord Hoffmann thought that ‘we could have no better 
authority than that of the High Court of Australia in Stevens v Head’206 and considered that Pfeiffer 
only changed the definition of procedural laws for interstate questions in Australia.207  Lord Rodger 
similarly treated Stevens as still being authoritative, and thought that both Tolofson’s and Pfeiffer’s 
view that the assessment of damages was a question of substance applied only to internal 
proceedings in the Canadian and Australian federations.208  The House of Lords may have read 
the conclusion in Pfeiffer too narrowly, but it nevertheless still reached a different position to that 
in Australia on how to classify the assessment of damages.       
 
D. A Commonwealth sub-group: the trans-Tasman market area  
The UK’s entry to the EEC had particularly profound implications for New Zealand.  In 1960, 
over 53 per cent of its total exports were to UK markets, compared with 22 per cent for Australia 
and 17 per cent for Canada.209  To allow adjustment, the UK secured special and exclusive 
arrangements for New Zealand from the EEC for a five year transition period that New Zealand 
managed to extend.210  New Zealand nevertheless had to secure new markets under conditions of 
free trade, and Australia was the obvious partner.211  Contemplating eventual UK accession to the 
EEC, a trade agreement between the two countries was struck in 1965.212  The more 
comprehensive Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement was concluded in 1983,213 and now 
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creates a single economic market reinforced by a longer-term arrangement for free movement 
between the two countries.  
 The improvement in access to markets itself does little to reduce the business risk of 
trading in the market area unless transactions and representations can be effectively enforced.  An 
efficient scheme for the cross-border enforcement of judgments was therefore required.  As has 
been seen,214 when in 2006 Australia and New Zealand considered the structure of a scheme for 
the enforcement of judgments between the two countries, they compared the Brussels I Regulation 
and Australia’s Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) — and unsurprisingly opted for 
the latter.215  As David Goddard commented, the two governments were conscious of ‘the limits 
and complexities’ of the Brussels I Regulation and strongly preferred ‘a much simpler regime built 
on our common acceptance of broad service rules coupled with an appropriateness test applied at 
the request of the defendant’.216   
 The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Acts passed in the two countries ensure that the Australia-
New Zealand scheme is aligned with the Australian federal scheme.  A writ issued out of any court 
in Australia or New Zealand may be served anywhere in either country and, on service, gives that 
court an unquestioned competence to judge the proceedings.217 A judgment of any court in 
Australia or New Zealand can be enforced anywhere in the market area218 — unless it is contrary 
to public policy in the place of enforcement.219  As any court in either country has both adjudicative 
and enforcement jurisdiction across both countries, the Acts also introduce two mechanisms to 
guide proceedings into the one court in the trans-Tasman area. The first generally applicable 
mechanism is a uniform standard of forum conveniens to have the most appropriate court in Australia 
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or New Zealand hear and determine civil proceedings.220  The standard used gives statutory effect 
to Spiliada, and was essential to prevent Australian courts holding on to the exercise of jurisdiction 
under the principles of Voth when a New Zealand court was the natural forum.221  The second 
mechanism is that, where there is an exclusive choice of court agreement selecting an Australian 
or New Zealand court as the place for conducting litigation, the chosen court must deal with the 
proceedings.222  This provision takes the language of the HCCH Choice of Court Agreements 
Convention, and largely implements the Convention between the two countries.223  
 While the Acts set clear terms for the circulation of writs and judgments inside the market 
area, Australia and New Zealand have also edged close to a uniform scheme for civil jurisdiction 
in litigation that engages the ‘outer world’.  Again, there are English antecedents.  The New 
Zealand High Court Rules’ provision for long-arm jurisdiction224 owe a significant debt to those 
in Practice Direction 6B for England and Wales.225  In Australia, they have been modelled as the 
Harmonised Rules and promoted for adoption by Australia’s superior courts.  Almost all 
Australian state Supreme Courts have adopted them.226  They have not yet been adopted in the 
Northern Territory, Western Australia or the Federal Court.  However, the persistent difference 
between the application of the New Zealand High Court Rules and Harmonised Rules in force in 
Australia will be that, in its decision whether to proceed with or dismiss proceedings brought 
against a defendant outside the trans-Tasman area, the New Zealand court will consider whether 
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it is a forum conveniens by reference to the criteria of McConnell Dowell v Lloyd’s Syndicate 396227 and 
Spiliada.228  Australian courts will make the same assessment by reference to Voth.229  
The Australia-New Zealand scheme of civil jurisdiction and judgments is a consequence of 
the UK’s entry to the EEC.  Although the economic integration of the two countries may have 
taken place anyway, the reason that it did take place was because of the ‘shock’ to both countries, 
but to New Zealand in particular, caused by the loss of UK markets.  As Michael Kirby put it, the 
two countries are ‘leftovers’ of the Empire.230  And a scheme that allows any court in either country 
complete jurisdictional competence over individuals and businesses in the other, without an 
overarching court of appeal, is only possible because of the shared Imperial background and its 
legal tradition.     
 
E. After Brexit 
1.  Lawmaking in the UK and the rest of the Commonwealth  
The development of private international law in the Commonwealth during the UK’s period in 
the EU shows that, in general, the UK’s membership of the EU itself had little direct effect on the 
changes that took place after 1973.  The Australia-New Zealand jurisdiction and judgments scheme 
is unusual in being designed for a single market area that arose as a consequence of the loss of UK 
markets,231 and even there the scheme was cut to an Australian pattern that itself developed in 
response to other processes of legal decolonisation.  Further, the Europeanisation of the UK’s 
private international law, coupled with the Commonwealth’s unwillingness to adopt European 
institutions,232 have seen important legal developments in the UK being regarded as irrelevant for 
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the Commonwealth.233  After Brexit, the retention of the rules of the Rome I and II Regulations 
in the UK is likely to see the other Commonwealth countries engage more closely with each other 
than with the English courts on questions of applicable law in contract and tort.  However, this is 
a distancing that is driven by legislation and not by any weakness in the shared common law 
tradition.  The suggestion that Gaudron J made in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Inc v Fay that the 
English judiciary had become acculturated with European attitudes to civil jurisdiction seems to 
be unique.234  The view does not seem to have been shared by other Commonwealth judges, and 
in the same case was explicitly rejected by Wilson and Toohey JJ as providing any excuse to 
disregard English precedent.235    
Any decline in the influence of the UK courts on legal development in the private 
international law of Commonwealth countries owes much more to other processes of legal 
decolonisation.  The comments made by La Forest J in Tolofson v Jensen and Kirby J in John Pfeiffer 
Pty Ltd v Rogerson about the removal of appeals to the Privy Council partially explains the behaviour 
of Commonwealth courts after 1973.236  However, the constitutionalisation of private law that 
generated the more radical changes in Tolofson and Pfeiffer was more a product of the UK’s 
abdication of its lawmaking power for Canada and Australia in the 1980s.237  This is not to say, 
outside the applicable law questions in contract and tort, that the English courts risk losing the 
esteem that they have long enjoyed as the courts that matter most in the Commonwealth’s 
common law adjudication.  The uptake of Spiliada standards of forum conveniens, a process that only 
began while the UK was in the EU, shows how remarkably influential the English courts remain.  
Apart from the position for New Zealand, this was a Commonwealth-wide development that did 
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not depend on Privy Council supervision.238  However, this influence now depends for the most 
part on the quality and persuasiveness of the adjudication.239  The law stated in Spiliada was 
coherent, met a clear policy purpose in civil jurisdiction and suffered no dissent in the House of 
Lords itself.  In contrast, a decision like Boys v Chaplin had no ratio and perpetuated a confusing 
and anomalous approach to applicable law.  It was bound to put pressure on independent national 
courts to change the law, but without any overarching coordination.  The interplay of precedent 
across the Commonwealth after Boys is a striking example of the capacity of courts to pick and 
choose authorities, instead of being bound to follow them.  An Australian decision is discarded in 
Australia and treated as unpersuasive in the Privy Council.240   However, it is followed in Canada, 
and the Canadian decision is then followed in Australia.241  The Canadian and Australian decisions 
are thought persuasive in Singapore, but they cannot be adopted.242  An Australian decision on 
how to treat the assessment of damages is overruled in Australia, but followed in England.243  
These tensions will persist, and Brexit will not change them.  Commonwealth courts will engage 
with each other, but the different common law of each country will evolve differently. 
 
2.  The enforcement of judgments  
It should be recalled that, so far as the other Commonwealth countries are concerned, the real 
difference that Brexit brings is the opportunity to secure greater access to UK markets.  The 
reduction of tariffs and subsidies, and the removal or increase of import and export quotas, 
might improve access to markets and will be welcomed.  However, they do not necessarily 
reduce the business and legal risk that is inherent in cross-border trading and commercial 
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relationships.  It is precisely why easing the ability to enforce judgments across borders often 
follows free trade.   
There is little reason to be satisfied with the current conditions for the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments between Commonwealth countries.  The common law’s approach in 
the early 20th century, despite the Imperial trade preference, was for English courts to treat colonial 
judgments on precisely the same restrictive terms as they did foreign judgments.244  Scrutton J tried 
in Phillips v Batho245 in 1912 to be more generous in the recognition of decrees ‘of Courts within 
the British Empire’ that then had a shared sovereignty,246 but English and colonial courts refused 
to accept his view.247   This is the reason why, with greater consciousness of the implications of 
the shared but divided sovereignty of federal Canada, La Forest J was so critical of the application 
of the English common law rules to the interprovincial enforcement of judgments.248  Judgments 
of a sister-province should be enforced if the proceedings had a real and substantial connection 
with the rendering court.249  Similarly, the Australian federal scheme gives interstate recognition of 
judgments without enquiring into the jurisdiction exercised by the other state’s courts – the 
assumption being that if the judgment debtor had contested the rendering court’s jurisdiction then 
that court must have eventually concluded that it was the forum conveniens.250  The creation of the 
single market with New Zealand has seen the same generous basis for the enforcement of 
judgments incorporated into the trans-Tasman scheme.251 
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The current judgments schemes across the broader Commonwealth are anchored in the 
19th century English courts’ approach to foreign judgments and have remained structurally 
unchanged since the 1930s.  The Administration of Justice Act 1920 (UK) set up a scheme only 
for the Empire and Commonwealth, and still includes arrangements for the enforcement of 
judgments for New Zealand and Singapore.  The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) 
Act 1933 (UK) was intended for judgments from foreign, rather than Commonwealth, countries, 
but the scheme it introduces covers judgments from Australia and Canada and is the model more 
commonly adopted across the Commonwealth for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments.  
Australia,252 some Canadian provinces, 253  New Zealand254  and Singapore255  have reciprocating 
legislation although, oddly, all of these are modelled on the UK Act of 1933.  This legislation 
improves on the common law by providing for enforcement by registration and not litigation,256 
but it has a narrow base for the enforcement of qualifying judgments.  First, the judgment must 
be for a sum of money.257  Secondly, the registration of the judgment can be set aside if the 
judgment debtor had not conducted business or had not been resident in the place of the rendering 
court, or had not voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of that court.258  The conditions on 
which the other Commonwealth court is taken to have had jurisdiction to give the judgment are 
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roughly those of the 19th century common law.  Although Saskatchewan has amended its legislation 
to ensure that a court is taken to have jurisdiction to render judgment if it meets the Morguard 
standard of being in a place that has a real and substantial connection with the proceedings,259 it is 
most unlikely that there will be wholesale revision of the Commonwealth schemes to incorporate 
doctrine that is peculiar to Canada.  
The broader Morguard bases by which the original court is recognised as having jurisdiction 
to render a judgment that is locally enforceable have been criticised as over-exposing Canadian 
businesses to the judicial power of foreign courts.260  The criticism is in part justified, inasmuch as 
the Morguard standard has been extended not only to judgments beyond the Canadian federation 
but also to judgments from foreign countries that may not recognise any Canadian judgments 
whatsoever.  However, the price of securing the enforcement of transactions and integrity in 
commercial negotiations is that local businesses are sufficiently exposed to cross-border judgments 
to ensure that they can be compelled to perform contracts, pay damages for breach, or be subject 
to remedies for deceit and negligent misrepresentation.  Any reduction of legal risk in trading and 
commercial relationships after Brexit will therefore require broader bases for recognising 
judgments than the schemes under the Acts of 1920 and 1933 can support.  A comprehensive 
judgments scheme should allow for the enforcement of orders in specie, and especially injunctions, 
and accept that courts that exercise common special jurisdictions – the court for the place of the 
performance of a contract, for the place that gives a contract its applicable law, for the place where 
a tortious act that caused harm occurred – are assuming legitimate international jurisdictions.  
Although the federal schemes in Canada and Australia, and the trans-Tasman scheme, do more 
than this, Brexit will not bring the integrated economic markets that support them.  This leaves 
three options, all of which require Commonwealth countries to be more prepared to accept 
civilian-influenced measures than they have generally been prepared to. 
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First, the UK may be seeking re-entry to the modified Lugano Convention, and it is an 
instrument that is technically open to other countries.261  However, the experience of proposals in 
the Commonwealth to adopt the Lugano Convention suggests that other countries have little 
appetite to join Lugano.  Australian and New Zealand proposals to accede to the Lugano 
Convention disappeared after the Trans-Tasman Working Party recommended against adopting 
any scheme modelled on the Brussels I Regulation.262  And as it may be that Brussels I and Lugano 
were only considered in Australia and New Zealand because the UK was a member of the EU, 
this seems an unlikely means after Brexit of reshaping private international law within the 
Commonwealth.     
Secondly, a small gain in improving the enforcement of contracts could be made with the 
adoption of the HCCH Choice of Court Agreements Convention.  The UK and Singapore are 
already parties and, when the UK had the advantage of EU accession to the Convention, it had 
already eased the enforcement of judgments between the two countries.263  The enforcement of 
judgments under the Commonwealth schemes modelled in the Acts of 1920 and 1933 allow 
registration where the judgment debtor had agreed to submit to the court’s jurisdiction,264 and this 
includes submission by an exclusive choice of court agreement.  The Convention, though, has a 
broader definition of choice of court agreements that are deemed to be exclusive than the common 
law does, and it has stronger means than the common law of requiring a choice of court to be 
honoured.  Australia and New Zealand have already, in part, implemented the terms of the 
Convention between themselves,265 and it would seem a useful support for international 
commercial contracts to add the Convention to the terms of any trade agreements with the UK. 
 
261 See text to above n 37. 
262 See text to above nn 49–56. 
263 Ermgassen & Co Ltd v Sixcap Financials Pte Ltd [2018] SGHCR 8; see Choice of Court Agreements Act (Sg). 
264 See above n 258. 
265 See text to above nn 222–223. 
39 
 
And thirdly, the HCCH Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments266 is presently the most promising broad-based means of recognising judgments that 
can improve the legal security of trade and commerce.  The jurisdictions recognised under the 
Judgments Convention are much more expansive than those recognised at common law and under 
the Acts of 1920 and 1933; the significant difference being that special jurisdictions which depend 
on the proceedings having a connection with the place where the court making judgment was 
located are given legitimacy.267  In many respects, the Judgments Convention borrows from the 
Brussels I Regulation and the modified Lugano Convention and, so, also bears a strong civilian 
quality.268  No Commonwealth country has yet signed the Judgments Convention, although there 
is some support for it.269  It is not as generous as the recognition of judgments is in the Australian 
federal scheme and under the Canadian Morguard structures.270  However, the Judgments 
Convention may yet be the best means of bridging the old Imperial rules and the modern federal 
schemes in ways that, for the Commonwealth, can help to give legal effect to the economic 
opportunities of Brexit. 
 
266 Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters (concluded 
at The Hague 2 July 2019). 
267 Art 5 Judgments Convention.   
268 See, eg F Garcimartin and G Saumier, Explanatory Report on the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2020) 98-
110.  
269 M Douglas, M Keyes, S McKibbin and R Mortensen, ‘The HCCH Judgments Convention in Australian Law’ (2019) 
47 Federal Law Review 420; T Yeo, ‘The Hague Judgments Convention – A View from Singapore’, Singapore Academy of 
Law Journal, e-First, 3 August 2020. 
270 Eg, see J Blom, ‘The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act and the Hague Conference’s Judgments and 
Jurisdiction Projects’ (2018) 55 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 257.  
